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ABSTRACT

When the fields of intellectual property law and biotechnology intersect, most analysis is driven by
economic and ethical issues. This article examines these factors, but in relation to the emerging
security threat posed by biohackers, or do-it-yourself ("DIY") scientists, who operate free from
oversight and industry norms at the fringes of the biotechnology community. Public health risks are
poised to grow as these citizen-scientists race for lucrative discoveries in the new frontier of synthetic
biology. This article proposes that the existing paradigm adjust accordingly to leverage regulatory
compliance from the most ambitious biohackers looking to benefit from patent protection. The U.S.
government could bring aspiring entrepreneurial biohackers into the fold by making noninstitutional patent applicants undergo Center for Disease Control biosafety training, personnel
screening, and lab registration one year prior to receiving patent application eligibility in order to
reduce some of the potential risk of these unmonitored labs present.
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PATENT OFFICE AS BIOSECURITY GATEKEEPER: FOSTERING RESPONSIBLE
SCIENCE AND BUILDING PUBLIC TRUST IN DIY SCIENCE
BRIAN J. GORMAN*

INTRODUCTION

Much analysis at the intersection of intellectual property law and biotechnology
is driven by economic and ethical issues.' These factors are considered within, but in
relation to the emerging security threat posed by biohackers operating free from
oversight and industry norms at the fringes of the biotechnology community. 2 Public
health risks are poised to grow as citizen-scientists race for lucrative discoveries in
the new frontier of synthetic biology. 3 Thus, it is recommended that the existing
paradigm adjust accordingly to leverage regulatory compliance from the most
ambitious biohackers looking to benefit from patent protection. 4
The U.S.
government could bring aspiring entrepreneurial biohackers into the fold by making
non-institutional patent applicants undergo Center for Disease Control ("CDC")
biosafety training, personnel screening, and lab registration one year prior to
receiving patent application eligibility.
Requiring biosecurity compliance as a
condition precedent to patent application eligibility could help reduce some of the
potential risk of an unprecedented gold rush in garage labs.

*C) Brian J. Gorman 2011. Brian J. Gorman is an Assistant Professor at Towson University
and the Director of Biosecurity Commons. He has been at the forefront of biosecurity policy issues

since 2005 and participated in invitation-only meetings on biosecurity with leaders in science,
government, and business in the U.S. and Europe. His policy proposals on biosecurity were
presented to the Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security at the National
Academies in Washington, D.C. and his proposals were made available to Congress via the
Congressional Research Service. In addition, staff from the Obama Administration has conferred
with him on biosecurity issues. He has a B.A. from Stony Brook University, a M.Sc. from Trinity
College, Dublin, and a J.D. from New York Law School where he earned the Otto L. Walter Award
for "Outstanding Published Scholarly Writing."
1 See Christopher May, On the Border: Biotechnology, the Scope of Intellectual Property and
the Dissemination of Scientific Benefits, in THE ROLE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY INNOVATION 254 (David Castle ed., 2009).
2 See Heidi Ledford, Lifehackers: Amateur Hobbyists Are Creating Home-brew MolecularBiology Labs, but Can They Ferment A Revolution?, 467 NATURE 650, 650 (2010) (discussing those
biohackers who work out of the public eye, with labs in closets, kitchens and garages).

3See generally Gaymon Gennett et al., From Synthetic Biology to Biohacking: Are We
Prepared?, 27 NATURE BIOTECH. 1109, 1109-11 (2009) (discussing the need for a "rigorous,
sustained, and mature approach" to prepare of risks associated with the growth of biotechnology).
4 See May, supra note 1, at 258.
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I. THE RISK OF DO-IT-YOURSELF SCIENCE5

"Biohackers," otherwise known as do-it-yourself ("DJY") scientists are a new
phenomenon in the life sciences. 6 They are unique because they conduct research
from their homes or other nontraditional venues 7 and range in training between
complete amateurs and moonlighting Ph.Ds. 8 The DIY movement is underway as a
result of the decreased cost of lab equipment and revolutionary advances in the life
sciences combined with the promise of discovery and reward. 9 Unfortunately, this so
called "democratization of science,"o1 0 which puts greater scientific power in the hands
of a broader base of personnel actually raises challenging security and public health
concerns."
Chief among these concerns is the proliferation of "dual use" science,
which can be applied toward either civilian or criminal ends. 1 2
The U.S. government has been grappling with the dual use dilemma with
institutional researchers for several years. 1 3 The advent of the DIY scientist,
5 Special thanks to J. Corey Creek, J.D. candidate 2013, University of Maryland School of Law,
for research assistance on this paper and the staff of the John Marshall Review of Intellectual
Property Law for their invaluable editorial assistance.
6 Ledford, supra note 2, at 650.
7 Id.
Would-be "biohackers" around the world are setting up labs in their garages,
closets and kitchens-from professional scientists keeping a side project at home
to individuals who have never used a pipette before.
They buy used lab
equipment online, convert webcams into US $10 microscopes and incubate tubes
of genetically engineered Escherichia coli in their armpits.
Id.
8 Id. (reporting that Rob Carlson, a physics Ph.D. student at Princeton University, took the
advice of Dr. Sydney Brenner, head scientist of the Brenner's Molecular Sciences Institute in
Berkeley, California, and set up a garage lab in 2005).
9 See generally id. (illustrating in the first diagram what little cost is associated with setting up
a garage lab). For example, "[t]hey buy used lab equipment online, convert webcams into US $10
microscopes and incubate tubes of genetically engineered Escherichia coli in their armpits. (It's
cheaper than shelling out $100 or more on a 37 oC incubator)." Id.
1oId.
'The era of garage biology is upon us,' he [Carlson] wrote in a 2005 article in the
technology magazine Wired. 'Want to participate?' The democratization of
science, he reasoned, would bring in new talent to build and improve scientific
instrumentation, and maybe help to uncover new industrial applications for
biotechnology.
Id.
11E.g., id. (stating that, in response to the increase in DIY science, the FBI has adopted a
"neighborhood watch" stance encouraging DIY scientist to monitor and report any threatening
behavior).
12 DANA A. SHEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33342, OVERSIGHT OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH: THE NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY 1, n. 1 (2007) (stating,

"Dual-use biological research, in this context, is defined as "biological research with legitimate
scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a biologic threat to public health and/or national
security.").
13

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 18-19,
110 (2004).

[The United States] . .. is only one of many pursuing biotechnology research at
the highest level. The techniques, reagents, and information that could be used
for offensive applications are readily available and accessible. And the expertise
and know how to use or misuse them is distributed across the globe. Without
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however, adds new dimensions to the dual use dilemma. In addition to the increased
possibility of intentional misuse of dual use science there is greater cause for concern
over accidents and errors with dual use science. 1 4 Specifically there are increased
risks of laboratory error unique to amateurs, short cuts taken by moonlighting
researchers competing for lucrative patents in their garages, and of course the
intentional threat from terrorists or criminals seeking to exploit the improved access
to lethal biotechnology in garages or community based hacker spaces. 15 Thus, the
United States faces an ill-timed game changer with the growing interest in DIY
science in garage labs.

II. THE DIY OVERSIGHT CHALLENGE
There is an interesting philosophical split in the scientific community between
those for and against the use of patents in the life sciences. 16 The DIY movement is
inspired in part by those clearly looking to reap great financial rewards from
discoveries in their garages. 17 But the movement is also very much a part of
proponents of the open science movement who likewise oppose the use of
encumbering patents. 18 The divergent reactions to a change in the United States'
position on gene patents speak to the rift. 19 The United States recently changed
position and declared in court filings in October 2010 that genes should not be
subject to patents, unlike manipulated DNA. 20 Thus, the key area of concern,
synthetic biology, will most likely remain patentable subject matter. The oversight
proposal discussed infra relies on the U.S. Patent Office as a linchpin to leverage
compliance because the typical DIY scientist using dual use science for profit will
probably seek patent protection if possible.

international consensus and consistent guidelines for overseeing research in
advanced biotechnology, limitations on certain types of research in the United
States would only impede the progress of biomedical research here and undermine
our own national interests.

Id.
14See NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES
FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF RESEARCH INFORMATION 26 (2007).
15See id.
16Samuel Packer, Biomedical Research and the Law-Embryonic Stem Cells, Clones,

Andgenes: Science, Law, Politics, and Values: Article: Embryonic Stem Cells, Intellectual Property,
and Patents: Ethical Concerns, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 487-88 (2008) (discussing how various
philosophical schools would decide on whether stem cell research is ethical).
17Ledford,
supra note
2,
at
650;
see About
BioCurious, BIOCURIOUS?,
http://www.biocurious.org/index.php?title=AboutBioCurious (last modified Feb. 3, 2011).
18See,
e.g.,
About
the
BioBricks
Foundation, THE
BIOBRICKS
FOUND.,
http://bbf.openwetware.org/OurGoals.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) (seeking to ensure that
BioBrick standard biological parts remain freely available to the public).
19See generally Andrew Pollack, Gene Patent Ruling Raises Questions for Industry, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 1, 2010, at Bi.
20 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party, Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 2010-1406 (Fed. Cir. filed Oct. 20, 2010), on
appeal from 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y) (2010).
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Unfortunately, DIY labs lack competent peer support and institutional
oversight, which are emerging as cornerstones in policy deliberations on dual use
science and security. 21 Academic and industry labs are governed by professional
norms and regulations that are simply not commensurate in the DIY community
despite efforts by DIY advocates to mimic these institutional attributes through
communal oversight of hacker spaces. 22 These attempts are clearly inadequate
standing alone, but are an important step nonetheless. 23 The popularity of synthetic
biology in the ranks of DIY researchers heightens concern over the lack of
oversight. 24
Synthetic biology is,
the use of advanced science and engineering to make or redesign living
organisms, such as bacteria, so that they can carry out specific functions.
Synthetic biology involves making new genetic code, also known as DNA,
that does not already exist in nature. 25
These security issues are compounded by the fact that the United States is
grappling with security and oversight issues for life science research activities in
institutional settings. 26 Rapidly unfolding developments in the life sciences create a
need to evaluate biosecurity risks at all levels because specialized know-how is more
widely available and the costs of conducting specialized research is decreasing. 27
On one hand, these factors lead to risk from malefactors seeking to exploit newly
accessible science in pursuit of bioterrorism. 28 A vibrant DIY science community

21See NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 14 (stating "[t]he foundation of
oversight of dual use research includes investigator awareness, peer review, and local institutional
responsibility.").
22Ledford, supra note 2, at 652 ("The FBI seems to have taken the message on board, and has
adopted what some call a 'neighborhood watch' stance. The approach relies on biohackers
monitoring their own community and reporting behaviour they find threatening, says Edward You,
a special agent in the FBI's bioterrorism unit.").
23 See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 110-11.

24 Ledford, supra note 2, at 651.
Many biohackers are keen to tackle projects that involve engineering cells by
piecing together new genetic circuits, an approach called "synthetic biology".
DIYbio has picked up both momentum and stigma from this field, which has been
alternatively hyped and decried as the solution to society's ills or the nursery for a
bioterrorist scourge.

Id.
25HART RESEARCH Assoc., AWARENESS AND IMPRESSIONS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: A REPORT
OF FINDINGS BASED ON A SURVEY AMONG ADULTS 7 (2010), http://bio.org/ind/syntheticbiology/

hart2010report final.pdf.
26 See, e.g., Martin Matishak, Biosecurity Panel Findings Sent to U.S. Cabinet Officials for
Approval, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE, Nov. 19, 2010 ("[T]he findings of a presidentially mandated
panel assigned to identify the most dangerous disease agents and offer strategies to boost
safeguards at research facilities that house them have been presented to senior administration
officials.").
28 Eric Lipton, U.S. Lists Possible Terror Attacks and Likely Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at
Al (stating that the Department of Homeland Security identified and estimated the effect of a
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may inadvertently accelerate the progress of would be bioterrorists by giving them a
free ride through the benefits shared within the community and even cover for illicit
activities if garage labs become commonplace. 29 On the other hand, well-intentioned
biohackers run the risk of making amateur errors in garage labs operating beyond
the professional norms and institutional oversight found in traditional labs. 30
Human errors in unconventional labs conducting sophisticated research are of
particular concern. 31 If accidents can happen at respected university and industry
labs, it is reasonable to expect that amateur garage labs would incur an even higher
rate of error. 32

III. DIY GROWTH BY GOLD RUSH AND BioBRICK
Thus, the critical question begged from a security perspective regarding DIY
biotechnology is whether there will be a biotech-bubble reminiscent to the dot-com
bubble of the 1990's. A biotech gold rush or bubble involving DIY scientists could be
disastrous for public health and national security before appropriate oversight
mechanisms are put in place. 33 The prospect of a biotech bubble has recently become
the topic of conversation on investment blogs. 34 The following post was made in
January 2011:
I think there is a potential for another bubble over the next decade....
there is one I am particularly interested in and that is biotech .

. .

. I think

we are on the cusp of a decade of remarkable breakthroughs which will
change the way we do medicine.... breakthroughs will come via large
firms, others will be in smaller companies.... The list of potential
number of terror threats, which included anthrax, pneumonic plague, food contamination, and the
intentional spread of foot-and-mouth disease).
29See Howard Wolinsky, Kitchen Biology: The Rise of Do-It-Yourself Biology Democratizes
Science, but Is It Dangerous to Public Health and the Environment?, 10 EUR. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY
ORG. 683, 684 (2009) (stating that DIY science is a "double-edged" sword that could be used for
malicious purposes as well as benefitting society).

30See id. at 683 ("[S]ome legislators and scientists worry that do-it-yourself (DIY) biology
might pose a danger to public health and environmental safety, and that unregulated experiments
conducted in kitchens and garages might accidentally or intentionally unleash biological disaster.").
31See id. at 685.

[W]hen people start assembling complex systems that involve tens to hundreds of
genes from a variety of different organisms, those types of experiments outstrip
the current biosafety paradigm. There could be unpredictable effects and interactions that might result in self-replicating organisms that escape into the
environment and cause ecological damage and even public health threats [...]
we should not be as casual about the risks as I believe the DIY biologists are.
Id. (quoting Jonathan Tucker, a Senior Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation
Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies).
32See id. (comparing research conducted in university laboratories versus DIY laboratories and
the inherent dangers).
33 See id. (stating that part of the problem is that amateur science is moving faster than
regulators and legislators).
34 See, e.g., John Mauldin, The Coming Biotech Bubble, INVESTOR'S INSIGHT (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/john mauldins outside the box/archive/2010/01/1 1/thecoming-biotech-bubble.aspx.
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blockbuster therapies from current research is enormous and growing.
There are going to be some companies, which will simply see their stocks
explode.... Everyone will want to be in at the beginning of a new home
run. As the decade goes along, we will see companies go public before they
are really ready, just because they have a great story and people will want
to fund that story. 35
The enthusiasm laying the ground-work for a biotech gold rush also emanates
from within the DIY community as evidenced by claims made by the DIY entity
known as BioCurious:
Until recently, biotech has required large start up costs. An ecosystem of
mentorship and a network of investors who understand the possibilities for
lean-biotech-start ups to leverage shared resources and amplify their
creative efforts to have disproportionate commercial impact, is urgently
needed. BioCurious will catalyze the formation of this system. 36
One prominent biohacker, Rob Carlson, likewise acknowledged the profitable
potential of biohacking. 37 He said, "We're going to see a lot more at the garage level
that will produce a variety of products in the marketplace, one way or another." 38 It
is no secret that life science research can be lucrative and is important for the
economy, thus the United States needs to be prepared for the possibility of explosive
growth in the area with particular attention to biohacker labs.39 Unfortunately, the
report from a Presidential Commission tasked with advising the government on
synthetic biology assumed an advocacy role for DIY science by framing it as a legal or
moral right. 40 In addition, the Commission explicitly advised the United States
against implementing oversight of the DIY community at this time. 41
The
Commission did acknowledge that government oversight may be necessary for the
DIY community working with synthetic biology at some point in time. 42 But the
35 Id.
36 About BioCurious, supra note 17.

37 See Ledford, supra note 2, at 652.
38 Id.

39 See, e.g., Patrick Cox, The Coming Biotech Bubble, INVESTOR'S INSIGHT (Jan. 11, 2010),
http://www.investorsinsight.com/blogs/john-mauldins

outside the box/archive/2010/01/1 1/the-

coming-biotech-bubble.aspx ("[P]rivate investors will not only profit from this [biotech] revolution,
they will power it.").
40PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS: THE
ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 142 (2010) [hereinafter NEW
DIRECTIONS],
http://www.bioethics.gov/documents/synthetic-biology/PCSBI-Synthetic-BiologyReport-12.16.10.pdf ("In academic communities, intellectual freedom is essential. The ability to

explore ideas openly and freely-even controversial or unpopular ideas-is fundamental to the
mission of education and research.").

41Id. at 148 ("Scrutiny is required to assure that DIY scientists have an adequate
understanding of necessary constraints to protect public safety and security, but at present the
Commission sees no need to impose unique limits on this group.").
42 Id. at 146-47 ("To exercise the appropriate level of oversight, the government will need to
monitor the growth and capacity of researchers outside of institutional settings. This effort may
require the government to expand current oversight or engagement activities with these noninstitutional researchers.").
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Commission recommended a wait and see approach relying of the expectation that it
will take a few years before the DIY community poses serious public health and
security threats. 43 The Commission's recommendation, however, was met with
criticism by those who see the risk as a near term concern.44
The Presidential Commission on synthetic biology addressed DIY science
because it is a popular interest for many biohackers, and it is clear that serious
biohackers have and are likely to continue investing heavily into their garage
investments. 45 An article in Nature about a prominent biohacker, Rob Carlson and
the biohacker phenomenon captured the sentiment:
Still, five years after taking science into his garage, Carlson says he's
convinced that biohacking has the potential to trigger a technological
revolution. "We're going to see a lot more at the garage level that will
produce a variety of products in the marketplace, one way or another," he
says. Once his tadpoles have been optimized, Carlson hopes that publishing
his work will attract further investors. Meanwhile, he feels his experiment
in garage-based innovation has so far been a success, despite the delays and
personal sacrifices. "Part of the exercise was to determine whether or not
we could bootstrap this thing," he says. "The answer appears to be 'yes'. As
long as you are willing to be patient and to eat nothing but rice for dinner
occasionally." 46
Carlson's activities are that of a small business, not a DIY hobbyist or a mere
curious hacker. 47 Investors do not back hobbies. 48 But the promotional activities of
43 Id. at 147 ("This recommendation acknowledges that the norms of safe and responsible
conduct that have evolved over time for many researchers in institutional settings may not be
understood or followed by those new to the field or outside of these settings, but it is not a call for
specific restraints upon the DIY community at this time.").
44 Rob Stein, Presidential Commission Urges Caution on 'Synthetic Biology,' WASH. POST, Dec.
16, 2010, at A4.
Allison A. Snow, a professor of evolution, ecology and organismal biology at Ohio
State University, said the report 'sends a mixed message that is too watered

down.' A coalition of more than 30 environmental groups sent a joint letter to the
commission criticizing the failure to call for tougher precautions, including a
moratorium until scientists prove such organisms are safe. 'Our main concern is
the potential environmental impacts of synthetic biology,' said Eric Hoffman of
Friends of the Earth, one of the groups that sent the letter. 'We think it is a
potentially very dangerous technology.'
Id.
45 See Ledford, supra note 2, at 651 ("Many biohackers are also keen to tackle projects that
involve engineering cells by piecing together new genetic circuits, an approach often called 'synthetic
biology'.").
46 Id. at 652.
47 Id. ("[The United States is] going to see a lot more at the garage level that will produce a
variety of products in the marketplace, one way or another.").
48Contra Jim Gorman, Inventor's Handbook, POPULAR MECHS., July 1, 2010, at 56 (providing
an example of an inventor who took the do-it-yourself approach for his hobby and licensed his design
to investors to become wealthy).
Lonnie Johnson, who fashioned his Super Soaker prototypes using a Unimat
hobby lathe and milling machine while moonlighting from his job at NASA's Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, intended to manufacture his invention. Bids he received
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some academics are accelerating the interests of the DIY hobbyist in contrast to the
gold rushing DIYer. 4 9 Much like the gold rushing DIY advocates, some segments of
the academic community are also advancing the use of synthetic biology despite the
uncertain public health and security landscape. 5 0 The Biobrick Foundation and the
iGEM competition work aggressively to advance the use of synthetic biology. 51 iGEM
is:
[T]he premiere undergraduate Synthetic Biology competition.
Student
teams are given a kit of biological parts at the beginning of the summer
from the Registry of Standard Biological Parts. Working at their own
schools over the summer, they use these parts and new parts of their own
design to build biological systems and operate them in living cells. 52
BioBricks maintains a registry of biological parts that is designed to be open and free
from patent protection. 53 The Biobricks program is unrestricted and open to all who
are interested in synthetic biology. 54 Any individual or organization is welcome to
design, improve, and contribute BioBrickTM standard biological parts to the
Registry. 55

from injection molding companies quickly killed that idea." When I learned it
would cost $200,000 to make 1000 guns, I decided to license," he says. "I didn't
have that kind of money." Today he does. Retail sales of the Super Soaker have
exceeded $1 billion, and royalties have made Johnson a wealthy man.
Id.
49 Ledford, supra note 2, at 651 (noting that most DIY biology community are hobbyists rather
than businessmen intending to turn a profit).
50 See, e.g., Advances in Synthetic Biology: Significance and Implications: Hearing before H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. (2010) (Statement of Anthony S. Fauci, M.D., Dir. of
the Nat'l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases).
While the advance made by JCVI [J. Craig Venter Institute] scientists potentially
could be used by those who intend to do harm, we also must recognize that this
was not a simple experiment; it was an extraordinarily complex project that took
many years, people, and millions of dollars to complete. While there certainly is a

chance that the technology developed by JCVI researchers might be used for
nefarious purposes by those with extensive resources, it is important to point out
that similar, albeit simpler techniques, are in widespread usage and are an
integral and vital tool in life science research and science education, including
high school through post-graduate curricula.
Id.
51 IGEM,

http://ung.igem.org/MainPage (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
iGEM and the Registry of Standard Biological Parts have a large and diverse user
community. The skill levels run from high-school students who are new to
synthetic biology to world-acclaimed experts in the field. Our user community
spans the globe with users from over 26 countries and regions participating in the
iGEM competition alone last year.

Id.

52

About iGEM, IGEM.ORG, http://ung.igem.org/About (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).

53 See About the BioBricks Foundation, supra note 18; BioBrick Tm Public Agreement, THE

BIOBRICK FOUND., http://biobricks.org/programs/biobrick-public-agreement
2011).
54 See RioBrick TMPublic Agreement, supra note 53.
6 Id.

(last visited Mar. 25,

[10:423 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

432

The emerging reality, however, is that the life science community is a growing
confluence of university, government, for-profit, and non-profit entities which can
include DIY scientists. Battelle's 2008 report on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry
spoke to the linkages. It stated:
A new paradigm has emerged in which leading technology companies are
looking to universities and innovative emerging companies for new
technologies, rather than investing as many resources in internal high-risk
R&D work as in the past. As a result, more and more companies are
looking for opportunities to partner with research universities. Universities
are looking to corporations and entrepreneurs to provide an avenue to move
their discoveries into applications.
Such relationships are extremely
important in the biosciences as the link between basic science and new
product development is very strong. 56
There may be an interesting philosophical rift in the scientific community on the
use of patents, which affects security risks. It is argued that the patent seekers are
more likely to encourage a broader interest in DIY science, but both camps encourage
the proliferation of high consequence science and proponents on both sides of the
patent debate do have serious business aspirations.5 7 For instance, despite a position
against patents for biological parts, Drew Endy was a key player in a high profile
multi-million dollar start up called Codon Devices. 5 8 Thus, both camps are similar in
that they welcome all who are interested and it appears that the risks generated by
their science outpaces their ability to assure public health and security safeguards.59
In this connection, a number of these leaders of the open science or DIY movement
are unified in their position against U.S. regulation that would be perceived as
hindering their cause. 60 Moreover, it is not surprising to see the apparent influence
56BATTELLE TECH. P'SHIP PRACTICE, TECHNOLOGY, TALENT AND CAPITAL: STATE BIOSCIENCE
INITIATIVES

2008

58 (2008),

http://www.bio.org/local/battelle2008/StateBioscience Initiatives

2008.pdf.
57See Jed Lipinski, Turning Geek into Chic, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2010, at Al (stating an

entrepreneur helped raise capital for a science lab, while another is building a wet lab in a
warehouse-like space); Wolinsky, supra note 29, at 684; see also Julian Guthrie, Do-It-Yourself
Biology on Rise, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2009, at Al ("Members of this informal network of wannabe
biologists, entrepreneurs and artists are buying bacteria online, cobbling together discarded
equipment, and holding parties to transect DNA and exchange live cultures.").
58Erika Check Hayden & Heidi Ledford, A Synthetic-Biology Reality Check: Is the Abrupt
Closure of Prominent Player Codon Devices An Omen for the Field?, 458 NATURE 818, 818 (Apr. 15,
2009) ("Codon Devices was backed by a range of top-drawer venture capitalists. The scientific
founders, alongside Church, were Drew Endy, then of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
("MIT") in Cambridge, who was working on the development of small, reusable genetic components
known as BioBricks."); see Bernadette Tansey, Leaving MIT for Standford, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26,
2007, at Dl.
5 See Tansey, supra note 58, at Dl; Wolinsky, supra note 29, at 685.
60See Wolinksy, supra note 29, at 685.
Carlson also conceded that DIY biology has the potential to go wrong, although he
is cautious of too much regulation. "There is probably risk now and it will grow,
but you also have to ask what happens if you regulate [. . .. ] There are plenty of
historical examples of what's happened to markets for distributed technologies
when proscription or prohibition is implemented. I use the word prohibition quite
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the DIY and open science movement had with the Presidential Commission since
leading advocates were invited speakers at Commission meetings. 61 Included among
the speakers were Jason Bobe, Robert Carlson associated with DIY, in addition to
Drew Endy and Randy D. Rettberg who are behind BioBricks. 62
The persuasive powers of this group may help explain why the Presidential
Commission minimized DIY dangers and went so far as to defend DIY science as a
legal right extended from academic freedom. 63 After discussing academic freedom,
the report made a segue in support of biohackers with the following statement:
Second is the right of all individuals to freedom of inquiry. The DIY
research communities and other private researchers are exercising such
freedom but without the institutional norms and procedures designed to
assure responsibility, although these groups often develop their own
mechanisms intended to do so. 64
The market and the money behind it, has faith that biohackers are more akin to
small businesses than stamp collectors or gardeners. 65 New equipment created and
marketed for biohackers is clearly not intended for the naive amateur. 66 A recent
review of a new personal genomics machine intended for biohackers introduces a
piece of equipment that is much cheaper than similar equipment in academic or
industrial labs, but well beyond the budget of the typical hobbyist. 67 The potential
gold rush appeal of synthetic biology in garage labs also serves to complicate matters
even further. 68 Synthetic biology promises to be a lucrative field and the interest in
moonlighting in a potentially rewarding endeavor is likely to propel the popularity of
home based synthetic biology to even greater heights:
Thinking of setting up your own genomics lab in the garage? ... The
Personal Genome Machine (PGM) by lon Torrent is a DIY biologist's
fantasy: it's fast, compact, and the first sequencer to come even close to
commercial viability. . . . The PGM is their contribution to the growing
intentionally:

we have a very clear experience with what happened in this

country when [fermentation] was proscribed in the 1920s.[ ... . .] [It] created
markets [for alcohol] that were blacker and more difficult for the federal
government to deal with than [before]."
Id.

61See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 175-77.
62See id. at 176-77; Board of Directors, THE BIOBRICKS FOUND., http://biobricks.org/aboutfoundation/board-of-directors (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
63See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 142.
64 Id

65 See, e.g., Ledford, supra note 2, at 652 (reporting that Carlson started out a garage lab as a
hobby, but found it too difficult and eventually moved to a commercial space to begin a small
business).
66See id. at 651 (providing examples of the costs associated with purchasing new equipment
for biohackers); see Drew Halley, DNA Sequencing for 1/10 the Price: Ion Torrent's Sequencer
Arrives, SINGULARITY HUB (Dec. 27, 2010), http://singularityhub.com/2010/12/27/dna-sequencing-for110-the-price-ion-torrents-commercial-sequencer-arrives.
67 See Halley, supra note 66.
68 See Robert Carlson, The Pace and Proliferation of Biological Technologies, 1 BIOSECURITY

AND BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, SCI. 203, 206 (2003).
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commercial genomics marketplace, and a powerful reminder of how
sequencing tech is following Moore's Law. It will set you back $49,500 ...
which still keeps it out of reach for all but the most affluent DJYers. Still,
at less than 1/10th the price of competing sequencers . . . don't be surprised

if it starts making headway into research labs.

69

Thus, it is offered that patents, the very mechanism that helps assure financial
reward among biohackers, may be used to leverage compliance with a remedy that
helps assure a culture of responsibility in a critical segment of the DIY community.70
Stakeholders have yet to identify the appropriate boundaries or regulations for DIY
science, but once the right balance is found, it can be enforced with a segment of the
DIY community of concern-those seeking fortune from synthetic biology in their
garage.7 1 It is proposed within that the DIY community could help assure its public
trust by demonstrating that it registered labs with regulatory authorities, completed
biosafety training provided by the CDC, and is keeping convicted felons away from
risky research. 72

IV. FORESTALLING OVERSIGHT THROUGH DIY ADVOCACY

Advocates of DIY science have been effective in spreading a message that
accentuates the positive and minimizes the negative risks. 73 Perhaps the greatest
69 See Halley, supra note 66.
70 See Andrew W. Torrance, Synthesizing Law For Synthetic Biology, 11 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 629, 650 (2010).

It has long been widely assumed that technological innovation was best spurred
by either governmental funding or property-like incentives, such as patents and
copyrights. The United States Constitution explicitly enables Congress '[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.' However, the rise in importance of open source and free software, as
well as insight into the phenomena of user, open, and collaborative innovation,

has revealed an increasingly significant alternative to proprietary models of
innovation. Within the field of synthetic biology, there are influential scientists,
notably Drew Endy, Tom Knight, and Randy Rettberg, who have vigorously tried
to push the field in the direction of open innovation.
Id.
71See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 8, 13.
The Commission sees no need at this time to create additional agencies or
oversight bodies focused specifically on synthetic biology. Rather, the Commission
urges the Executive Office of the President, in consultation with relevant federal
agencies, to develop a clear, defined, and coordinated approach to synthetic
biology research and development across the government. A mechanism or body
should be identified to: (1) leverage existing resources by providing ongoing and
coordinated review of developments in synthetic biology, (2) ensure that
regulatory requirements are consistent and non-contradictory, and (3) periodically
and on a timely basis inform the public of its findings. Additional activities for
this coordinating body or process are described in other recommendations.
Id.
See id. at 12.
73 See Wolinsky, supra note 29, at 684; Lipinski, supra note 2, at 1.
72
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proof of this is found with the support of DIY science in the Presidential Commission
report on synthetic biology, and following presentations by DIY advocates. 74 This
success was impressive, especially because there are unusually strong feelings and
concerns over synthetic biology in the general public. 75 The Hart Foundation
recently found that 52% of the population polled believed that synthetic biology
should be regulated by the government and 33% thought such science should be
banned altogether. 76
It is in the best interests of biohacker advocates to argue that the DIY
community is effective in providing security through self-policing. This claim was
even apparently accepted at face value by a Presidential panel addressing synthetic
biology. 77
Biohackers may have found a sympathetic ear in the Presidential
Commission drawn largely from academia, but that support is of limited value when
popular opinions in society support government regulation of synthetic biology and a
significant minority of the public actually believe that there should be a ban on
synthetic biology research.78
The public concern reflected in the Hart poll suggests that the debate over
synthetic biology and biohackers will not be confined to elite and rarified panels of
insiders. 79 Awareness of synthetic biology is growing and it is likely that such
awareness will only grow over time. 80 Therefore, the DIY community must do more
than earn the confidence of kindred souls in expert advisory panels. 81 The public and
lawmakers to whom they answer will only grow more familiar with the risks
associated with synthetic biology of which insiders are cognizant. 82 Concerns and
admonitions over the next generation of life science research are both ominous and

74 See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 159-60, 176-77.
7 See, e.g., Torrance, supra note 70, at 661; Jeanne Whalen, In Attics and Closets, 'Biohackers'

Discover Their Inner Frankenstein: Using Mail-Order DNA and Iguana Heaters, Hobbyists Brew
New Life Forms; Is It Risky?, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at Al; Markus Schmidt, Diffusion of
Synthetic Biology: A Challenge to Biosafety, SYST. SYNTH. BIOL. 1, 2 (2008).
76 HART RESEARCH ASSOC., supra note 25, at 1, 11-12 (2010) ("A ban should be placed on
synthetic biology research until we better understand its implications and risks."). "Synthetic
biology research should be regulated by the federal government because voluntary research
guidelines developed jointly by industry and government cannot provide adequate oversight." Id.
77See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 142.
Intellectual freedom and responsibility can be understood in two senses. First is
the special institutional attribute-academic freedom and responsibility-that
pertains to the 'academy'. . . . Second is the right of all individuals to freedom of
inquiry.
The DIY research communities and other private researchers are
exercising such freedom but without the institutional norms and procedures
designed to assure responsibility, although these groups often develop their own
mechanisms intended to do so.
Id.; Ledford, supra note 2, at 652.
78 See HART RESEARCH ASSOC., supra note 25, at 1, 11-12 (2010); NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note
40, at 8, 13, 125.
7 See HART RESEARCH ASSOC., supra note 25, at 1, 11-12 (2010).
80 See id. at 3-5.
81 See id. at 13.
82 See id.; Whalen, supra note 75 ("A senior official in the FBI's Weapons of Mass Destruction
Directorate says the bureau is working with academia and industry to raise awareness about
biosecurity, 'particularly in light of the expansion of affordable molecular biology equipment' and
genetic databases.").
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foreboding. 83 Two examples include the claim that the, "science that may cure some
of our worst diseases could be used to create the world's most frightening weapons," 84
and the fear that synthetic biology could, "mindlessly screw up the unity of life on
earth".85

Vocal pioneers of the biohacker movement are framing it as benign and
romantic. 86 Evidence is found in efforts to eschew terms such as biohacker and
replace it with the term "DIY scientist."8 7 Rather than drawing association with
hackers in the computer industry, DIY scientists portray themselves as idealistic
thinkers and tinkerers with nothing but an innocent hobbyist's interest in
microbiology.8
Descriptions of independent life science researchers are, at times,
framed with a quixotic aura akin to Rousseau's view embodied in his fictional Emile
who has nothing but a noble and idealistic love of learning. 89 Biohackers have been
compared to historic efforts of the Wright brothers. 90 Biocurious, a Biohacker lab,
83 See Tansey, supra note 58 (stating that Drew Endy shares "some concerns with critics who
fear the technology will unleash engineered microbes with devastating consequences to the
environment, increase the danger of biowarfare, and convert rural economies into corporate mega
farms that displace food production.").
84 OFFICE OF TRANT'L ISSUES, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE DARKER BIOWEAPONS
FUTURE, OTI SF 2003-108 (Nov. 3, 2003).
85Markus Schmidt et al., Synbiosafe E-Conference: Online Community discussion on the
Societal Aspects of Synthetic Biology, SYST. SYNTH. BIOL., Sept. 18, 2008, at 12.
86 See generally Wolinsky, supra note 29, at 683-85 (2009) (stating DIY scientists argue that

demystifying the science behind genetic and medical tests is empowering); see also Guthrie, supra
note 57, at Al (stating that DIY scientist enthusiasts remain clear that their hobby is a positive
development in a world).
87 See Lipinski, supra note 57, at Al (showing an example of the media referring to

biohackers as the more friendly term "citizen scientists"); Gary Richmond, Extending the Free
Software Paradigm to DIY Biology, FREE SOFTWARE MAG. (June 2, 2009), http://fsmsh.com/3146

(explaining that he tries to avoid using the term "biohackers" because of its negative and
misleading connotations).

88 See Guthrie, supra note 57, at Al (describing that the term "hacker" to the general public is
not good, but it actually mean "someone who takes something apart and puts it back together in a
new way, maybe a way that's better"); Richmond, supra note 87 (explaining that most DIY scientists
just want to create their own data in their garage).

89 See Garage Biology: Amateur Scientists Who Experiment at Home Should Be Welcomed By
the Professionals,NATURE, Oct. 7, 2010, at 634.
Media coverage has taken its toll on the public's perception of "DIYbio". Stories in
the press are often peppered with sweeping claims of the monumental advances to
be made by unleashing the talents of the public at large on important biological
questions. Equally common are breathless warnings that a bioterrorist is busy
crafting the next plague in a garage, safe from the watchful eye of the authorities.
Neither image rings true. Most biohackers are hobbyists who delight in crafting
their own equipment and who tackle projects no more sophisticated than those
found in an advanced high-school biology lab.
Id.; see also JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE: OR, CONCERNING EDUCATION 1 (1883) (stating that
"Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things; everything degenerates in the
hands of man.").
90
See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 141-42.
Intellectual freedom lies at the heart of America's scientific enterprise. Such
freedom facilitates the innovation and industry that have fueled its success.
History is rife with examples in which ingenuity, hard work, and unfettered
creativity have yielded extraordinary, sometimes unexpected, scientific advances
for the betterment of society as a whole. From Benjamin Franklin studying
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likewise invites comparisons of their citizen science with the pre-industrial days
where "Science was once a cultural activity, carried out by wealthy 'gentlemen
scholars' who had the leisure and material resources to experiment." 91 Yet in the
next breath, their statement stirs gold rush temptations by promising that
prospective biohackers who join them can be a part of a "disproportionate commercial
impact," 92 of their pursuits. More assuring claims, however, are made by a leading
advocate of the biohacker movement, Jason Bobe, who equates biohacker activity to
the innocence found in the most rudimentary middle school labs. 93 Bobe addressed
the biosecurity concerns of biohackers in a recent article in Nature:
Bobe has interacted with and advised the FBI, but says he finds many of
the biosecurity fears of the FBI and the public to be unfounded. "The
amateur activity right now is at the seventh- or eighth-grade level," he says.
"We're making $10 microscopes and all of the discussion around us is about
weaponized anthrax." 94
Concerted or not, there appears to be a grassroots lobbying effort by garagebased bioentrepreneurs who try to frame the biohacker in a quaint light on one hand,
while opposing regulation and oversight of their movement in the other. 95 Carlson
argued against the regulation of biohackers with the following statement, "A superior
alternative is the deliberate creation of an open and expansive research community,
which may be better able to respond to crises and better able to keep track of
research whether in the university or in the garage." 96 This argument has been
proffered to fend off regulation of institutional researchers. 97 Nobel Laureate David
electricity with a kite in a raincloud, to the Wright Brothers testing different
aerodynamic control systems and building the first successful airplane, students
learn every day about the value of intellectual and scientific freedom and
exploration.
Id.
91See About BioCurious, supra note 17.
92 Id. ("Until recently, biotech has required large start up costs. An ecosystem of mentorship
and a network of investors who understand the possibilities for lean-biotech-start ups to leverage

shared resources and amplify their creative efforts to have disproportionate commercial impact, is
urgently needed. BioCurious will catalyze the formation of this system.").
93 See Ledford, supra note 2, at 652.
94

Id.

9 See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 159.
As noted, democratic deliberation is based on ongoing interaction among citizens
on topics of common interest. For an emerging technology such as synthetic
biology, many of these dialogues will be among scientists or other interested
citizens and policy makers or regulators.
Such interactions are vital to a
democracy, but they are not sufficient. Exchanges among individuals and groups
of citizens are also important. In particular, grassroots collaborations have been
established around synthetic biology.
Groups such as DIYbio are loosely
organized networks of self-described "citizen scientists" coming together because
of a common interest in the tools, methods, and applications of synthetic biology,
rather than shared professional affiliations or policy responsibilities. In this way,
the "do-it-yourself' community embodies a "do-it-together" ethos.
Id.

96Carlson, supra note 68, at 203.
97

E.g., id.

[10:423 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

438

Baltimore used a similar argument to rationalize a position against a biosecurity
proposal on Due Process Vetting presented by this author at a closed briefing to the
National Academies Committee known as CSANS-the Committee on Scientific
Communication and National Security at the National Academy of Sciences. 98
Baltimore assured that a global response to a biological threat from all good
scientists is superior delaying the release of dangerous dual use research findings
which could be misused by malefactors. 99 Baltimore then cited the response to the
SARS epidemic as an example. 100 Baltimore's example was elicited off the cuff rather
than by prepared comments and meant to illustrate a robust response from the
scientific community, but the fact remains that SARS was controlled by public health
interventions, not by the findings of any researchers who scurried to their benches to
find a cure.101
The question is whether the efforts of the existing Laboratory Response Network
1 02
The justifications
("LRN") established in 1999 is inadequate or needs expansion.
against scientific regulations citing universal response noted by Carlson and
Baltimore both failed to note the federal government's LRN. 1 03 The existing LRN
appears to accomplish the need for a unified response to an emergency requiring a
research-based approach. 1 04 One report notes:
The LRN is charged with maintaining an integrated network of laboratories
that can respond to bioterrorism, chemical terrorism and other public
health emergencies. The LRN includes federal and state public health
facilities, medical institutions, and others. These laboratories are primarily
engaged in diagnostic and public health testing of samples, especially in an

98Brian J. Gorman, Balancing Secrecy and Open Science: The Dual Use Dilemma, Address to
the Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security at the National Academy of
Sciences (Oct. 30, 2006) (on file with The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law).
99Id.
100 Id.
101Chad T. Marley, Marc E. Levsky, Timothy S. Talbot, and Christopher S. Kang, SARS and
its Impact on Current and Future Emergency Department Operations, 26 J. OF EMERGENCY MED.
415, 419 (2004) ("Over the past year, SARS has adversely affected millions of people and cost
international economies hundreds of billions of dollars. It has frustrated public health officials and
stymied research efforts. Recent successes have occurred in controlling the SARS epidemic despite
the lack of specific details; primarily through general health measures and coordinated public health
policies.").
102See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FACTS ABOUT THE LABORATORY RESPONSE
NETWORK 1 (2011), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/factsheet.asp.

In 1999, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established the
Laboratory Response Network (LRN). The LRN's purpose is to run a network of
labs that can respond to biological and chemical terrorism, and other public
health emergencies. The LRN has grown since its inception. It now includes
state and local public health, veterinary, military, and international labs. This
fact sheet provides a brief description of the LRN, and how it works.
Id.
103See David Baltimore, Limiting Science: A Biologist's Perspective, 107 DAEDALUS 37, 44
(1978); Carlson, supra note 68, at 203-14.
104 FRANK GOTTRON & DANA SHEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40418, OVERSIGHT OF HIGHCONTAINMENT BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 13 (2009).
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emergency situation where additional capacity for such testing is needed.
Many of these laboratories possess BSL-3 capabilities. 105
The approach to controlling dangerous dual use research findings is worthy of
serious debate, and Baltimore's argument deserves due consideration, but the notion
of investing a nation's biosecurity in the hands of gold rushing biohackers or
gentlemen hobbyists simply fails the giggle test.

V. ASSESSING RISK

It appears that sophisticated scientists looking to strike out on their own
without the encumbrances of university oversight and profit sharing are the
biohackers leading the DIY movement. 1 06 Thus far there are distinct types of
biohackers emerging. 107 Focus on these distinctions will help an otherwise imprecise
dialogue that has started with regard to the biohacker. This is especially necessary
in breaking down DIY science risks to assess the emerging problems in development
in this area. There appear to be three types of DIY researchers which breakdown
further and present different challenges:
A. DIY-Professional Scientist.o108
Either gainfully employed in a traditional scientific setting, but
moonlighting; or

1.

ii. a full-time DIY scientist working as an independent researcher.
B. DIY-Amateur Scientist. 109
The mere curious hobbyist; or

1.

ii. a gold rush amateur looking to obtain a profitable patent; or
iii. an amateur responding to a personal health crisis.
C. DIY-Malefactor.

110

105 Id.

106 See Ledford, supra note 2, at 651.

Carlson [a physics PhD student at the time] started his garage lab as something
of a hobby, but he needed to do it without sapping resources from his lab at the
University of Washingtonin Seattle. He bought equipment such as refurbished
micropipettes-a staple in any molecular biology lab-and a used centrifuge on
eBay. In 2007, fed up with grant applications and eager to spend more time
working in his garage lab, he gave up his position at the university altogether.
Id.
107

See id.

108 See id.
109 See id.
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Either a biohacker who acts in the tradition of computer hackers by
engaging in illegal or improper activity in pursuit of gratuitous harm; or

ii. a lone actor working on criminal application of biotechnology; or
iii.

a terrorist working alone or in concert with others with training that
may be expert or self-taught.

Approximate risk levels can be attributed to the three categories of DIY
scientists in relation to types of risk (see table 1). Five types of risks are evaluated as
either high or low against the class of DIY scientist. For instance, the use of a garage
lab for intentional harm is a risk for any scientist, even an industry professional
working at a high-containment government lab. 111 The findings of the Amerithrax
investigation concluded that it was indeed an inside government scientist behind the
anthrax attacks of 2001.112 This insider threat, although apparently low, is being
taken very seriously by the United States. 113
Thus far, the United States
commissioned a series of expert committees to make recommendations to address
this threat. 11 4 President Obama issued an Executive Order, "Optimizing the Security
of Biological Select Agents and Toxins in the United States," on July 2, 2010, which
calls for specific recommendations to address this threat. 115 The results of this
committee are expected in summer 2011.116
Thus, all threats should be taken seriously and be addressed in the most
judicious manner that balances scientific progress and security. An estimation of
intentional harm, however, places the insider threat from a high-containment lab as
low. It would likewise exist, but be low for the DIY-moonlighter, DIY amateur, and
the professional scientists in industry. It is quite clear, however, that the risk of
intentional harm is high for the DIY-Malefactor. Each of four additional risk factors
present with varying results with each class of scientist. For example, DIY-scientists
investing valued personal resources of time and money would be at risk of
committing lab errors and other inadvertent actions associated with lab safety that
one would expect by an individual in a gold rush for a lucrative and patentable
discovery. The risk of a professional scientist moonlighting was similarly deemed
high because the risk they can take may be greater in a garage lab given their
expertise. Dangerous experiments would be a risk for all scientists but more likely to
be high for the risk taking professional in a garage working on vaccine or
biosurveillance device or a malefactor looking to exploit the potential harm of an

110Malefactor Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/Malefactor
(last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
111See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, AMERITHRAX INVESTIGATIVE SUMMARY 1 (2009), available at
http://documents.nytimes.com/amerithrax-investigation-report.
112 Id
113Id.

114See PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., EXECUTIVE ORDER: OPTIMIZING THE SECURITY OF BIOLOGICAL
SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS IN THE UNITED STATES (July 2, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-

press-office/executive-order-optimizing-security-biological-select-agents-and-toxins-united-stat.
115Id.
116See Matishak, supra note 26 ("A panel of federal experts convened by an Executive Order in
July 2010, has made recommendations in this regard which be made public in late 2011.").
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experiment of concern. The Fink Report identified seven dual use experiments of
concern to be cautious about. 117
Risk Matrix

Malefacct

DIYMalfato
Amaeur
Amateur
DIY-Prof.
Moonlighe
MoonlighterI
Industry
Profssioa
Professional

High

High

High

High

Low

4/1

No

No

Low

High

Low

High

High

3/1

No

No

Low

Low

High

High

High

3/2

No

No

Yes

Yes

I
Low

Low

Low

High

High

2/3

VI. PENDING OVERSIGHT LANDSCAPE

Despite general concern over synthetic biology there is no call for a ban from
either the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity ("NSABB") 118 or the
Presidential Commission. 119 It does appear, however, that NSABB leaned more
heavily toward oversight than the Presidential Commission. 120 The Presidential
Commission recommended that the White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy merely keep an eye on the field rather than create a new oversight agency. 121
The Commission was very sympathetic to the biohacker, but did speak favorably of
education and training:
This effort may require the government to expand current oversight or
engagement activities with these non-institutional researchers. NIH or the
Department of Energy, for example, could be charged to sponsor education
programs and workshops that bring together these groups. They could fund
training grants or related programs to promote responsibility among this
community. To exercise the appropriate level of oversight, the government
117 NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 114-15 (2004).
118 NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY CONCERNS RELATED
TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 13 (2010) [hereinafter ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY] ("Biosafety concerns can

be adequately addressed by the application of current biosafety practices and procedures.").
119 NEw DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 8 ("The Commission endorses neither a moratorium on
synthetic biology until all risks are identified . . .
120 Compare ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY, supra note 118, at 13 (2010), with NEW DIRECTIONS,
supra note 40, at 101-02.
121 NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 8 ("[N]o need at this time to create additional agencies
or oversight bodies focused specifically on synthetic biology.").
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will need to monitor the growth and capacity of researchers outside of
institutional settings. 1 22
Yet the Commission explicitly advocated against "unique limits on this
group." 123
The NSABB made recommendations that arguably extend to
biohackers. 1 24 The NSABB offered several important recommendations with regard
to synthetic biology that should pertain to all life science researchers including
biohackers. 1 25 NSABB stated that:
1. Synthetic biology should be subject to institutional review and oversight
since some aspects of this field pose biosecurity risks;
2. Oversight of dual use research should extend beyond the boundaries of
life sciences and academia; and
3. Outreach and education strategies should be developed that address
dual use research issues and engage the research communities that are
most likely to undertake work under the umbrella of synthetic biology. 126
Pending legislation, H.R. 5498, specifically targets synthetic biology. 127 The bill
mandates an assessment of the current capability of synthetic nucleic acid providers
to effectively screen orders for sequences of homeland security concern. 1 28 Another
bill, H.R. 5057, does propose regulation of individual biohacker labs if they possess,
use, or transfer the new class of potentially dangerous agents and toxins. 129
There are some red flags for the DIY community, however, in the language of
extant and proposed laws. For instance, when H.R. 5057 addresses the necessity of
research on variola, it qualifies the statement as being within the "legitimate
scientific community." 1 30 A similar issue over language concerning biohackers arises
in 18 U.S.C. § 175(b), which states that "Whoever knowingly possesses any biological
agent, toxin, or delivery system of a type or in a quantity that, under the

122 Id.

at 12.
at 13 ("Scrutiny is required to assure that DIY scientists have an adequate
understanding of necessary constraints to protect public safety and security, but at present the
Commission sees no need to impose unique limits on this group.").
124ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY, supra note 118, at iii-iv.
125 Id. at 13-14.
126 Id.
127H.R. 5498 111th Cong. § 203 (2010).
SEC. 203. DUAL-USE TERRORIST RISKS FROM SYNTHETIC GENOMICS. (a)
SENSE OF CONGRESS.-It is the sense of Congress that the field of synthetic
genomics has the potential to facilitate enormous gains in fundamental discovery
and biotechnological applications, but it also has inherent dual use homeland
security risks that must be managed.
Id.
128Id. § 203(b)(1).
129H.R. 5057 111th Cong. § 3 18(b) (2010).
130Id. § 107(b)(2).
123 Id.
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circumstances, is not reasonably justified by a prophylactic, protective, bona fide
research, or other peaceful purpose, shall be fined under this title." 131
Thus, the questions remain over the meaning of "legitimate scientific
community," and "bona fide research." 1 32 It is probably safe to assume that
biohackers are not contemplated as part of the legitimate scientific community with
when it comes to variola. There appears to be more flexibility with bona fide
research, but it would probably need to be judged on a case-by-case basis without
more guidance from legal authority. 1 33 The U.S. Code does have a definition for bona
fide research with regard to marine mammal protection, which may be instructive. 1 34
Relevant elements of the definition include research which: "(A) likely would be
accepted for publication in a referred scientific journal; (B) are likely to contribute to
the basic knowledge of marine mammal biology or ecology; or (C) are likely to
identify, evaluate, or resolve conservation problems." 1 35
The marine science definition, which requires a peer review scholarship
standard-a contribution of basic knowledge to the field or help address problems in
the field, makes for a reasonable test for bona fide research. 1 36 The question is
whether or not such a test would or could be applied to biohackers in determining
whether there are subject to oversight or accorded certain rights or privileges.

VII. THE PATENT FOR SECURITY EXCHANGE

The term "consideration" is used herein as a term of art in its legal context.
Consideration is a well-established legal concept underlying legal contracts. 137
Consideration is defined in a number of ways, but it fundamentally encompasses an
exchange between two parties. 1 38 The exchange need not be equal or close to it, but a
fundamental notion of fairness in society rests on exchanges of value between
parties. 139 Ballentine's law dictionary defined consideration as, "an act or a
forbearance, the creation, modification, or destruction of a legal relation, or a return
promise bargained for and given in exchange for a promise." 1 40 The patent system
can actually provide an opportunity for governments to elicit voluntary compliance
with security requirements that may otherwise remain beyond government reach.
Moreover, the Patent Office is an appropriate place to infuse security requirements
since the patent system is actually a government incentive system designed to
promote industrial activity. 141 It would actually be irresponsible for governments to
create incentives for high-risk activities without a compatible regulatory framework.
131 18 U.S.C. § 175(b) (2006).
132 See id.; H.R. 5057, 111th Cong. § 318 (2010).
133 18 U.S.C. § 175(b); see H.R. 5057, 111th Cong. § 107.
134 16 U.S.C. § 1362(22) (2006).
135
136

Id
Id.

137

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 347-49 (9th ed., 2009).

138

Id
Id. at 134 ("Consideration that is fair and reasonable under the circumstances of the

139

agreement.").
140 BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (1995).
141 John A. Dienner, Patents for Biological Specimens and Products, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 286
(1953).
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The United States has yet to adhere to the warnings put forth in the World at
Risk report with institutional labs although some efforts for improved lab security
are pending. 142
Thus, providing oversight of DIY labs will present unique
challenges. 143 It is offered, however, that the United States could establish a
measure of oversight by mandating biohacker compliance with a number of security
protocols as a condition precedent to patent eligibility. The United States could
require lab registration, screen for personnel unfit for work in synthetic biology, and
CDC biosafety training. The requirements would not reach all biohackers, but it
could enlist the cooperation of a great many of concern and serve as a mechanism to
put others on notice that they too need to comply with the garage lab oversight
requirements.
The U.S. Patent Office has played an important role in furtherance of national
security since the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951 became law. 1 44 The Patent Office
routinely screens patent applications for novel discoveries with implications for
national security and issues a secrecy order that classifies the information if the
federal agency with expertise in the discipline covered in the application concurs with
the decision to classify. 1 45 The procedures are still in effect and a modest number of
secrecy orders are issued on private patent applicants each year. 1 46 In the fiscal year
of 2010 there were twenty-six secrecy orders imposed on private parties seeking
patents. 147 Given the successful functioning of this program it is fair to say that the
Patent Office could also serve as an effective gatekeeper for the screening of
biohackers.

142 See Matishak, supra note 26 (stating that a panel of federal experts convened by an
Executive Order in July 2010, has made recommendations in this regard which be made public in
late 2011).
143See id.
144 Invention

Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).

145Id

Whenever publication or disclosure by the publication of an application or by the
grant of a patent on an invention in which the Government has a property
interest might, in the opinion of the head of the interested Government agency, be
detrimental to the national security, the Commissioner of Patents upon being so
notified shall order that the invention be kept secret and shall withhold the
publication of the application or the grant of a patent there for under the
conditions set forth hereinafter.
Id. (emphasis added).
146Edmund Andrews, Cold War Secrecy Still Shrouds Inventions, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1992, at
A35.
Newly available data, obtained from the Patent Office under the Freedom of
Information Act by the Federation of American Scientists, show that the number
of new secrecy orders increased steadily from 290 in 1979 to 774 in 1991 and that
some of the biggest increases took place in the last three years. The total number
of secrecy orders in effect has grown steadily in the last decade, from 3,600 in
1979 to 5,893 in 1991.
Id.
147 Invention Secrecy Activity, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergovl
invention/stats.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
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VIII. PERSONNEL RELIABILITY PROGRAMS FOR THE GARAGE LABS

Personnel reliability programs ("PRPs") refers to the screening of personnel for
loyalty and stability. 148 PRPs are structured efforts designed to, "help ensure that
individuals with access to sensitive materials are trustworthy and reliable.

. .

. PRPs

may include background investigations, security clearances, medical examinations,
psychological evaluations, polygraph testing, drug and alcohol screening, credit
checks, and systems of ongoing monitoring." 149 Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory already uses a PRP with life science researchers. 150 The United States is
close to making regulations on personnel reliability programs, which are designed
keep unstable and disloyal personnel away from dangerous pathogens in high
containment labs. 15 1
The United States began looking at the application of personnel reliability
programs to scientists working in high containment labs in response to three
significant events. 152 Firstly, there was the F.B.I.'s finding that an inside researcher
working for the government was responsible for the anthrax attacks of 2001.153
Secondly, there was an alarming report from the U.K. that terrorists tried to
infiltrate labs as postgraduate students to acquire WMD expertise and materials. 154
Thirdly, the discovery of the A. Q. Khan proliferation network added to the urgency
for enhanced lab security. 155
It is unlikely that the United States could implement a comprehensive PRP for
the DIY community. 156 It could, however, be successful in running a basic program
that screens for easy to identify records that speak to the trustworthiness of an
individual, i.e. a criminal record.15 7 It would be quite reasonable to deny convicted
felons the benefit of patent protection in synthetic biology. 158 A great deal of trust is
required of DIY researchers working on synthetic biology and it is reasonable to
conclude that convicted felons are not worth risk of granting that trust. 159 Serious
consideration, however, must go in to applying PRP's further. For instance, an
argument could be made that researchers terminated from academic and
institutional settings for improper research conduct should likewise be restricted

148 See NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING PERSONNEL RELIABILITY
AMONG INDIVIDUALS WITH ACCESS TO SELECT AGENTS 5 (2009).
149 See id. at iii.
150 See Eric Gard, Lawrence Livermore Nat'1 Lab., LLNL Select Human Agent Reliability
Program (Dec. 10, 2008).
151 See NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 148, at ii.
152 See id.
153 See The F.B.L's Anthrax Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2010, at WK9.
154 NAT'L SCIENCE ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, NAT'L HEALTH INSTS. MINUTES OF
MEETING 3 (Dec. 10, 2008).
155 Mark Lander, Pakistan Chief Says it Appears Scientists Sold Nuclear Data, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 24, 2004, at A7.
156 Michael Greenberger, Talley Kovacs & Marita Mike, Governance and Biosecurity:
Strengthening Security and Oversight of the Nation's Biological Agent Laboratories, 13 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 77, 86 (2010).
157 See NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 148, at iii.
158 See, e.g., 735 ILCS § 5/24-1.1 (showing an example of other things convicted felons cannot
do, including possessing a firearm).
159 Id.

[10:423 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

446

from obtaining synthetic biology patents as a biohacker. 1 60 But such an expansion of
oversight would require due process for the applicant. 1 61 Other factors that could
possibly justify denial of garage lab privileges and patent protection include those
researchers found to have violated key rules and regulations related to biosecurity
and those deemed mentally unfit. 162 The question of mental fitness is a challenging
policy issue that requires further deliberation beyond the scope of this paper. The
recently released report that assessed the mental state of the man the F.B.I. deemed
responsible for the Antrhax attacks, will no doubt fuel debate on mental fitness and
personnel reliability screening for some time to come. 1 63

IX. TRAINING

The NSABB and the Presidential Commission both recommended that the
United States provide training and education for researchers in regard to synthetic
biology. 1 64 Proper training could help reduce the inadvertent safety lapses that are
more likely to take place in a garage lab. 1 65 A number of approaches could be used to
address the safety education requirement. DIY researchers could be tested on their
comprehension of various biosafety materials such as the CDC biosafety course, 1 66
and literature such as the NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA
Molecules, 167 Bological Safety: Principles and Practices, from the ASM Press, 1 68 in
addition to any other relevant occupational and safety resources.
The training should also include the role of peer reporting when suspicious
activity is discovered. 1 69 Peer reporting was advocated in Report of the Working
Group on Strengthening the Biosecurity of the United States in 2009.170 It was also

160Id. (showing the similarity between a convicted felon losing the right to possess a firearm as
analogous to a terminated researcher being banned from obtaining synthetic biology patents).
161See U.S. CONST. amend. 14, § 1.
162See NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 148, at iii.
163See generally Report of the Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel, RESEARCH STRATEGIES
NETWORK

1

(Aug.

23,

2010),

https://www.researchstrategiesnetwork.org/images/docs/

EBAPReportExSumRedactedVersion.pdf (discussing Dr. Ivins, the man behind the Anthrax
case and stating "The Panel's review of the sealed psychiatric records, however, does support the
Department of Justice's (DOJ's) determination that he was responsible.
Dr. Ivins was
psychologically disposed to undertake the mailings; his behavioral history demonstrated his
potential for carrying them out; and he had the motivation and the means. The psychiatric records
offer considerable additional circumstantial evidence in support of the DOJ's findings.").
164See NAT'L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 118, at 13; NEW DIRECTIONS,
supra note 40, at 146.
165 See NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 40, at 146-47.
166 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, BIOSAFETY IN MICROBIOLOGICAL AND
BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 22 (2009).
167 See DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NIH GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING
RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES, 1-135 (2011).
168See generally DIANE 0. FLEMING & DEBRA L. HUNT, BIOLOGICAL SAFETY: PRINCIPLES AND

PRACTICE, 1-640 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the practice of laboratory safety when dealing with
various biological organisms).
169See DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
STRENGTHENING THE BIOSECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES 136 (2009).
170Id.
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advocated by Special Agent You of the FBI, who referred to it in the context of
"situational awareness." 171

X. LAB REGISTRATION

Registration is accepted practice in the United States and imposing an exception
for DIY biologists cannot be reconciled easily. 1 72 Moreover, registries will be used to
help researchers advance their work, thus it is entirely appropriate to use registries
for security purposes. 1 73 The NIH is creating a Genetic Testing Registry that is
intended to help researchers. 1 74 The GTR will be designed to "Facilitate genomic
data-sharing for research and new scientific discoveries." 175 Health and Human
Services successfully maintains a registry of tens of thousands of labs. 1 76 The
registry serves an important public disclosure purpose. Under the program the
Centers for Medicaid and Medicare make a public list of those labs that have been
convicted under state and federal law of fraud, abuse, or received sanctions from the
governing authority. 177 In this connection, a proposed bill would create a new
government registry, which would list agents and toxins that have the potential to be
used in a biological attack. 178 A national database with the location of labs or
individuals housing these agents and toxins is included in the bill.179

XI. THE PRIVATE SECTOR POLICY GAP
The lab security reports of 2009 issued for the United States, on the whole,

failed to provide strong guidance to the U.S. government on how to manage the
emerging need for lab regulations in the private sector.s180 It is true that at present,
the private biotechnology sector generally presents less risk compared to government
and university labs, but risk is generated in that sector as well. 181 The private
biotechnology sector is diverse and would need varying degrees of oversight in like
manner to labs in other sectors. 182 Thus, the government should formulate a
stratified regulatory framework that matches the risk generated by the work
171 Edward You, FBI Special Agent, Presentation at the Open Science Summit: Safety and
Security Concerns: Open Source BioDefense (July 30, 2010).
172 See 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006).
173 See id. § 263(a).
174 Press Release, NIH Office of Commc'ns, NIH Announces Genetic Testing Registry (Mar. 18,
2010), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/mar20lO/od-18.htm.
175 Id.
176 See 42 C.F.R. § 493.1850 (2010).

177Id.

178 H.R. 5057 111th Cong. § 103(a) (2010) (amending Section 351A of the Public Health Service
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)).
179Id.

180 See HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 169, at 3; Brian J. Gorman & J. Corey Creek,
Risk & Reliability of Laboratory Personnel in BIOSECURITY COMMONS REV. 28-48 (May 2010),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/30902475/Bio-Security-Commons-AR-May-2010.
181
182

See id. at 27.
Id.
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undertaken in each type of lab rather than over-look some labs simply because they
lack government ties.
The regulatory framework needs to be even across the life science community as
recommended in the World at Risk Report because regardless of their affiliation or
form of incorporation. 1 83 The U.S. government clearly has authority to impose
regulations on all labs in the United States that generate a threat to national
security. 184 The challenge at hand, however, is fostering good faith compliance with
security initiatives in the gray areas, i.e. those labs that present lesser but
substantial or inconsistent risks that may go unnoticed by authorities as the
biotechnology sector expands. 185 Future growth in biotechnology will come in large
part from young biotechnology companies, which are developing their first products
and depend on investor capital for survival. 1 86 Therefore, a framework based on the
equitable notion of consideration could arguably generate the cooperation the U.S.
government needs to reach labs in the vast areas of the private sector. 187
The patent for security exchange paradigm should also help reduce the fears
associated with unilateral government regulations in the scientific community. This
approach could help foster a culture of responsibility in the private sector since those
seeking the benefits of patent protection would have a vested interest in fostering the
culture of responsibility at their growing startup and amongst their peers. The
benefits bestowed through government issued patents are critical for continued
growth of the biosciences. 188 In this connection, the fact that 82,000 bioscience
patents were issued from 2002 and 2007, speaks to the potential strength of the
relationship between industry growth and a culture of regulatory responsibility. 189
Many experts, including those voices represented in the many lab security
reports of 2009, tend to view the life science community as distinct sectors. 190 The
emerging reality, however, is that the life science community is a growing confluence
of university, government, for-profit and non-profit entities. 191 Thus the private
sector cannot simply be ignored; even the Department of Defense relies on private
contractors for work on Biological Select Agents and Toxins ("BSAT"). 1 92

183See BOB GRAHAM ET AL., WORLD AT RISK:

THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE

PREVENTION OF WMD PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM 25 (2008).

184See, e.g., Nat'1 Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011) (holding that
two parts of a standard employment background investigation in connection with NASA laboratories
did not violate a constitutional right to information privacy).
185See HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 176, at 25.
186Paul E. Schaafsma, The Case for Financial Product Patents: What the Supreme Court Got
Right and Wrong in Bilski v. Kappos, and a Suggestion for a Reasonable Line of Business Method
Patents, 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 398, 417 (2010).
187See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 183, at 25-26.
188See Schaafsma, supra note 186, at 417.
189 BATTELLE TECH. P'SHIP PRACTICE, supra note 56, at ES-3.
190 See HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 169, at 29.
191See BATTELLE TECH. P'SHIP PRACTICE, supra note 56, at ES-3.
192 DEPT. OF DEFENSE, INSTRUCTION: MINIMUM SECURITY STANDARDS FOR SAFEGUARDING
BIOLOGICAL SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS § 2.2 (2006).
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XII. TOWARD GLOBAL HARMONIZATION OF BIOSECURITY REGULATIONS

Finally, but equally important, the utilization of the patent office as a critical
intersection of security and intellectual property protection may help with the great
challenge of international harmonization. The establishment of a successful U.S.
patent for security paradigm could help establish linkages with further global efforts.
For instance, the World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO") could play a
role since it already works to harmonize intellectual property rights. 1 93 WIPO is in a
unique position to help bring harmonization of security measures to those seeking
patent protection in many nations. 1 94 In fact a number of the WIPO's strategic goals
are consistent with the global harmonization of a lab security framework. 1 95 The
WIPO seeks, among other things, a balanced evolution of the international normative
framework for intellectual property ("IP"), coordination and development of a global
IP infrastructure, international cooperation on building respect for IP, and it also
seeks to address IP in relation to global policy issues. 1 96 Thus, the WIPO may be able
to serve as a persuasive entree for international linkages between patent for security
programs in other nations. U.N.'s interest in harmonizing biosecurity oversight
likewise speaks to likelihood of success of international patent for security
programs. 197

193 Michael Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent Policy, Biotechnology, and African
Agriculture: The Case for Policy Change, 17 HARv. J. LAW & TECH. 321, 326 (2004) (stating that the
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